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States18 weaken the case as precedent for a situation
involving a straightforward land contract purchase.
Arguably, the latter would pose even less of a doubt as to
whether the interest was “like-kind” with a fee simple
interest.  Conceivably, the interest in Starker19 could be
stretched over a period of some years, until the expiration of
the life estate.  In the usual land contract transaction, the
purchaser acquires an equitable interest in the real estate with
a known period to conveyance of formal title.  It is true that a
land contract purchaser’s interest could be forfeited for non-
performance under the contract but that feature presumably
was present in Starker v. United States.20
Although Congress addressed another feature of the Starker
holding, namely the fact that the exchange did not have to be
contemporaneous, indeed that the court approved a
substantial delay in the acquisition of replacement property,21
Congress did not address the matter of whether a land
contract purchaser’s interest qualifies as “like-kind” to a fee
simple interest.  Presumably, the Congress was not greatly
concerned about that feature of the case although there is no
direct evidence in support of that conclusion.  Nonetheless,
the exchange of a contract purchaser’s interest in land for a
fee simple interest appears to be like-kind.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a][ii]
(2000); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16] (2000).
See also Harl, “What Is ‘Like-Kind’?”; 9 Agr. L. Dig. 149
(1998).
2 See Pieper & Harl, Iowa Farmland Ownership and Tenure
1982-1997:  A Fifteen-Year Perspective, Iowa Agriculture
and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State
University, January, 2000, p. 13 (9.5 percent of land
acquired under installment land contracts in 1997).
3 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
4 See Harl, “What Is ‘Like-Kind’?” 9 Agr. L. Dig. 149
(1998).
5 Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 687.
6 Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
7 Ltr. Rul. 9143053, July 30, 1991.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9601046, Oct. 10, 1995 (perpetual conservation
easement to Department of Interior).
9 Ltr. Rul. 9612009, Dec. 18, 1995.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c).  See Rev. Rul. 78-72, 1978-1
C.B. 258 (unexpired term of lease includes renewal option
p ri ds).
11 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (establishing time limits on
identifying replacement property and in receiving the
replacement property).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS .
FALSE SCHEDULES. The debtor made several false
lists of estate property and exempt property on the
bankruptcy schedules throughout the Chapter 7 case,
including omission of property and transfer of property
through the debtor’s business. The debtor had been denied a
discharge because of the false schedules. The court held
that the schedules became so unreliable that the debtor
would also be denied all exemption claims. In re Park, 246
B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtors operated a fish farm and
filed for Chapter 12. One debtor was the heir of a parent
who died shortly before the Chapter 12 petition. The debtor
disclaimed any interest in the estate one day before filing
the petition, resulting in the inheritance passing to the
debtor’s children. The debtors failed to include several
items of property on the bankruptcy schedules and had not
filed amended schedules by the time of this decision. The
court held that the Chapter 12 case was to be converted to
Chapter 7 because the debtors attempted to defraud the
creditors by concealing assets. The court chose conversion
instead of dismissal because the debtors had made several
preferential transfers which the Chapter 7 trustee could
recover for the benefit of creditors. In re Kloubec, 247
B.R. 246 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor had filed a previous Chapter
13 case and the issue was whether the previous case tolled
the three year period for purposes of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i) and whether the tolled period included the
six month provision in I.R.C. § 6503(h)(2). The court held
that the length  of the previous bankruptcy case plus six
mo ths was to be added to the three year period of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i) to determine which taxes were
dischargeable. In re Schultz, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,510 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000).
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TAX YEAR. The taxpayer was the sole general partner in
a partnership formed to purchase and develop real property.
The taxpayer filed for bankruptcy on July 11, 1991 and
argued that the partnership terminated on that date such that
the partnership losses passed to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
did not elect to terminate the tax year as of the bankruptcy
filing. The court held that, under state and federal law, the
partnership did not terminate until the partnership winding
up was completed. The court also ruled that the bankruptcy
filing did not cause the sale or exchange of the taxpayer’s
partnership interest because the transfer of the taxpayer’s
assets to the bankruptcy estate was not a sale or exchange
under I.R.C. § 1398(f). Therefore, the bankruptcy estate
succeeded to the partnership losses because the estate was
active on the last day of the partnership tax year. The court
also held that the losses were offset by the debt reduction in
bankruptcy under I.R.C. § 108(b)(1); therefore, the debtor
received only the partnership losses remaining after the
close of the bankruptcy case. Gulley v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-190.
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COTTON.  The AMS has adopted as final regulations
which set user  fees for cotton producers for 2000 crop
cotton classification services  under the Cotton Statistics
and Estimates Act at $1.35 per bale. 65 F d. Reg. 35807
(June 6, 2000).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations which add a new section for the insurance of
millet crops. The provisions will be used in conjunction
with the Common Crop Insurance Policy Basic Provisions,
which contain standard terms and conditions common to
most crops. The intended effect of this action is to convert
the millet pilot crop insurance program to a permanent
insurance program administered by FCIC for the 2002 and
succeeding crop years. 65 Fed. Reg. 37919 (June 19,
2000).
DRY WHEY . The AMS is soliciting comments on its
proposal to change the United States Standards for Dry
Whey that would lower the bacterial estimate of not more
than 50,000 per gram to not more than 30,000 per gram,
incorporate maximum scorched particle content as a
requirement for U.S. grade, and expand the test methods
section to allow product evaluation using the latest methods
included in Standard Methods for Examination of Dairy
Products, in the Official Methods of Analysis of the
Association of Official Analytical Chemists, and in
standards developed by the International Dairy Federation.
65 Fed. Reg. 38235 (June 20, 2000).
EGGS. The AMS has announced changes in the United
States Grade Standards for Shell Eggs, including deleting
the general term “Inedible eggs” and its definition, revising
the definition of the general term “Loss” eggs by including
examples of inedible eggs, revising the term descriptive of
an A quality white, and deleting specifications for
packaging materials. 65 Fed. Reg. 38239 (June 20, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives that would
increase the family-owned business deduction by $500,000
per year for four years to $4 million in 2005 with a cost-of-
living adjustment in years after 2005. H.R. 4562.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The decedent had
established a revocable trust which became irrevocable
upon the decedent’s death. The trust provided that an
individual had the right to use rent free a house as a
residence on trust property. In addition, the trust was to pay
the taxes, insurance and maintenance costs of the house
from trust income. The remainder of the trust passed to a
charitable organization, subject to the individual’s right to
use the house, a restriction on the trustee’s power to sell
agricultural land in the trust and the requirement that the
trustee was to offer a lease of the agricultural land to two
specified individuals before offering the lease to the general
public. Because the trust did not qualify as a charitable
remainder trust, the trustee petitioned a state court to reform
the trust to create two trusts. The individual would receive
an annuity amount equal to a certain percentage of the first
trust’s income for life instead of the use of the house. The
payments would be used to pay the fair rental value of the
house plus the costs of maintenance, taxes and insurance.
The charity would hold the remainder interest in the first
trust corpus. The charity was the sole beneficiary of the
second trust which included the agricultural property which
was subject to the same sale and leasing restrictions as in
the original trust. The IRS ruled that the reformation was
valid and that the reformed first trust was a qualified
charitable remainder trust with the value of the remainder
interest eligible for the charitable deduction. The entire
reforme  second trust was eligible for the charitable
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 200024014, March 8, 2000.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The
decedent’s will provided for passing of a portion of the
estate to two trusts for the surviving spouse. The first trust
was t  be funded from the estate residue with an amount
equal to the maximum marital deduction reduced by the
amount needed to use up the unified tax credit, with the
remainder to fund the second trust. The will empowered the
execut r to elect QTIP treatment for the first trust, and the
executor made that election. The executor also had the
power to split the first trust into two trusts, one with a
GSTT inclusion ratio of zero and one with an inclusion
ratio of one. The executor requested an extension of time to
make a reverse-QTIP election for the trust with the zero
GSTT inclusion ratio. The IRS ruled that the split of the
first trust was recognized for GSTT purposes and that an
extension of time was granted to file the reverse-QTIP
election. Ltr. Rul. 200023026, March 9, 2000.
GIFT . The decedent had sold land to a family farm
corporation in exchange for a promissory note. In each of
four years, the decedent had forgiven a portion of the note.
The decedent considered the forgiveness a gift to the family
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shareholders and claimed the annual exclusion for each gift.
The corporation’s bylaws required approval by 67 percent
of the shareholders for any sale of corporate property and
state law required a majority vote of shareholders for
declaration of a dividend. The IRS argued that the
forgiveness of the debt was not a gift eligible for the annual
exclusion because the forgiveness did not transfer a present
interest. The court agreed, holding that the shareholders did
not have any individual right to immediate use or
enjoyment of the gift because 67 percent of the
shareholders would have to agree to any property sale and a
majority was needed to declare a dividend. An article by
Neil Harl on this case will appear in a future issue of the
Digest. Stinson v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,377 (7th Cir. 2000).
The decedent’s will bequeathed a portion of the estate to
the surviving spouse in trust with a charitable foundation
and the decedent’s children as remainder beneficiaries. The
estate elected to treat the trust as QTIP. The surviving
spouse filed a nonqualified disclaimer of  the spouse’s
interest in the trust and the trust agreed to pay any resulting
gift tax. The IRS ruled that the value of the gift was reduced
by the gift tax paid by the trust. Ltr. Rul. 200022031,
March 3, 2000.
IRA . The decedent owned two IRAs which had a trust as
the beneficiary. The surviving spouse became the sole
trustee of the beneficiary trust upon the decedent’s death.
The beneficiary trust was to remain in existence until all
assets were distributed to a subtrust. The surviving spouse
was the sole trustee of the subtrust and had the
discretionary authority to distribute trust corpus and
income, including testamentary dispositions of the trust.
The spouse distributed the IRA funds in the beneficiary
trust to the subtrust and then to IRAs owned by the spouse.
The IRS ruled that the distribution of the decedent’s IRA
funds to the spouse’s IRA did not cause the IRA funds to be
included in the spouse’s income. Ltr. Rul. 200023030,
March 10, 2000.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION- ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s estate included several parcels of farm and ranch
property. The estate executor attempted to make the special
use valuation election under I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7) with the
estate tax return but failed to provide information on the
method of valuation based on cash rents on comparable
land. The return failed to account for state and local taxes
and to provide the actual annual rents of the comparable
properties. The estate argued that the missing taxes were
not essential and that taxes of zero should be used when the
special use valuation notice fails to list the taxes. The estate
provided only an average annual rent for the previous five
years for the comparable properties. The court held that the
estate could not make the I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7) election
because of its failure to identify and subtract the state and
local taxes in the special use valuation calculations and
failure to provide specific annual rents for the comparable
properties. The estate then argued that the failure of the
special use valuation election to qualify for the Section
2032A(e)(7) election automatically entitled the estate to use
the Section 2032A(e)(8). method. The Section 2032A(e)(8)
election required the IRS to provide the estate with notice
that the election did not fully comply with the election
r quirements. See I.R.C. § 2032A(d)(3)l Treas. Reg.
§20.2032A-4(b)(2)(i). The IRS had not provided the estate
with y notice that the special use valuation election,
under either section, was incomplete. The court held,
therefore, that the estate could still make the special use
valuation election under Section 2032A(e)(8) by providing
the needed information. Estate of Wineman v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-193.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS . The
deced nt had owned several farm and ranch properties and
h d transferred 24 percent of the homestead property to the
de dent’s children, although the decedent continued to live
in the homestead residence until death. The court found that
there was no implied agreement that the children would not
sell or otherwise transfer their portion of the homestead;
therefore, the transferred interest was not included in the
decedent’s estate because the decedent did not retain any
control over the 24 percent interest. Estate of Wineman v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-193.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned a
pa cel of land with a residence which the taxpayers used for
vacations, family gatherings and entertaining guests. The
taxpayer’s child owns a personal residence nearby and had
the permission to use the taxpayers’ property on occasion.
The t xpayers transferred their interests in the property to
an eight-year trust. The IRS ruled that the child’s
occasional use of the property did not disqualify the trust
for qu ified personal residence trust treatment. Ltr. Rul.
200022020, March 6, 2000; Ltr. Rul. 200023020, March
6, 2000.
UNIFIED CREDIT . The decedent and surviving spouse
ad owned a joint brokerage account and the decedent had
intended that the brokerage account be transferred solely to
the dec dent in order to increase the size of the decedent’s
gross estate so as to fully use the unified credit. However,
the transfer had not been accomplished prior to the
decedent’s death. The decedent’s will provided for passing
of the estate to the surviving spouse in trust. The surviving
spouse alleged that the failure to transfer the account to the
decede t’s name was the brokerage’s fault. The surviving
spouse and brokerage company reached a settlement under
hich the surviving spouse would transfer funds to the
brokerage company which would pay the additional funds
to the trust. The IRS ruled that the additional funds would
not be included in the decedent’s gross estate and were not
eligible for the unified credit because the funds did not pass
from the estate to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 200025032, March
23, 2000.
VALUATION . The IRS has adopted as final regulations
relating to the use of actuarial tables in valuing annuities,
interes s for life or terms of years, and remainder or
reversionary interests. The regulations contain new
actuarial tables. These regulations will affect the valuation
of inter vivos and testamentary transfers of interests
depend nt on one or more measuring lives. 65 Fed. Reg.
36907 (June 12, 2000).
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent owned 184 of
th 460 shares of stock in a family corporation which
operated a garden products company. The company had
pending litigation with a potential liability of more than
$100 million. The court allowed a discount for stock of a
Agricultural Law Digest 101
small capitalization company, a discount of 10 percent for
the litigation liability and 15 percent discount for lack of
marketability. Estate of Klaus v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-191.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
PROPOSED LEGISLATION. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate that would allow a tax credit
of up to $30,000 for “qualified value-added agricultural
property” placed in service in the tax year. The legislation
is similar to that introduced in the House of
Representatives. See p. 92 supra. S. 2746.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayers owned a company which
was sold for a fixed sum plus a variable commission equal
to $200,000 plus a percentage of the net sales over the next
seven years. The buyers defaulted on the commission
payments and the taxpayers claimed a bad debt deduction
for the missing payments. The taxpayers did not provide
evidence of the net sales or the amount due above the
$200,000 minimum. The court held that no bad debt
deduction was allowed above the $200,000 minimum
because the amount owed was not fixed or determinable
since the taxpayers did not provide sufficient evidence of
the net sales. The decision is designated as not for
publication. Koenig v. Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,503 (9th Cir. 2000).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer had filed a sexual harassment suit
against an employer and received a judgment for back pay,
front pay, pension benefits, attorneys’ fees and court costs.
Under the taxpayer’s legal fee arrangement with the
taxpayer’s lawyers, about one-half of the award was paid to
the taxpayer’s attorneys. The court held that all of the
judgment was included in the taxpayer’s income because
none of the award was for personal injuries. The taxpayer
could not exclude the attorneys’ fees from income, because
the attorneys did not have a property interest in the fee
portion of the award. The taxpayer, however, could claim
the fees as a miscellaneous deduction. Hukkanen-
Campbell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-180.
The taxpayer had filed a wrongful suit against an
employer and received a judgment for back pay, front pay,
and pension benefits. Under the taxpayer’s legal fee
arrangement with the taxpayer’s lawyers, about two-thirds
of the award was paid to the taxpayer’s attorneys. The court
held that, under Alaska law, the lien for an attorney’s fees
did not create a property interest in the award. The court
held that the taxpayer could not exclude the attorneys’ fees
from income, because the attorneys did not have a property
interest in the fee portion of the award. The taxpayer,
however, could claim the fees as a miscellaneous
deduction. An article by Neil Harl on this case will appear
in a future issue of the Digest. Coady v. Comm’r, 2000-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,528 (9th Cir. 2000).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayers owned a commercial
building and remodeled a portion for additional storage and
office space. The taxpayers did not provide evidence of the
cost of the remodeling other than county assessment
records. The court denied any depreciation deduction
resulting from the improvements because of the failure to
substantiate the costs. The taxpayers also claimed
depreciation deductions based upon the increase in value of
two outdoor signs. The court denied the deduction because
the tax basis was to be based upon the taxpayer’s cost and
not the value of the signs. Sandoval v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-189.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers,
husband and wife, were co-obligors on a debt which was
discharged. In the year of the discharge, the taxpayers filed
separate tax returns and the issue was the allocation of the
discharge of indebtedness income between the taxpayers. In
a Chief Counsel Advice, the IRS ruled that the
determination was to be made on the basis of all facts and
circumstances and included (1) whether either party had a
right of contribution from the other obligor; (2) the extent
either party enjoyed the benefits of the proceeds of the
indebtedness; (3) the extent either party was allocated the
basis from the indebtedness; and (4) the extent either party
claimed the interest paid as a deduction. Although the IRS
cknowledged that both taxpayers should not be assessed
the f ll discharge of indebtedness income, the Assistant
Chief Counsel advised that if the allocation could not be
made under known facts and circumstances, each taxpayer
sh uld be issued a notice of deficiency based on the entire
discharge of indebtedness. This places the burden of
allocation on the taxpayers. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200023001,
Feb. 4, 1999.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The North Carolina
legislature enacted a disaster relief program for state
citizens who suffered losses from Hurricane Floyd in 1999.
The recipients of the payments had to reimburse the state if
the property was sold within five years. The IRS ruled that
the payments could be excluded from income as social
benefit program payments except to the extent the
reci ients had claimed a loss deduction on the property.
CCA Ltr. Rul. 200022050, April 5, 2000.
On May 19, 2000, the president determined that certain
areas in South Dakota are eligible for assistance under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §
5121, as a result of severe storms and flooding on April 18-
20, 2000. FEMA-1330-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who
sustained a loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the
loss on his or her 1999 federal income tax return.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS . The
taxpayer had purchased two existing retail store properties.
The stores were not selling gasoline at the time of purchase
and the axpayer did not know that gasoline stations had
b en op rated at the properties. Underground storage tanks
we e still in place and had leaked gasoline into the soil. The
taxpayer claimed the soil cleanup expenses as a current
busine s deduction but the IRS argued that the cleanup
costs had to be capitalized into the purchase price of the
properties. The court held that the cleanup costs had to be
capitalized because the taxpayer did not cause the
contamination and the cleanup improved the condition of
the property, even though the value of the property did not
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increase above what the taxpayer paid for them. United
Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,538 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period July 1, 2000 through September 30, 2000, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 9 percent (8
percent in the case of a corporation) and for underpayments
is 9 percent. The interest rate for underpayments by large
corporations is 11 percent. The overpayment rate for the
portion of a corporate overpayment exceeding $10,000 is
6.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 2000-30, I.R.B. 2000-25, 1266.
LETTER RULINGS . The IRS has announced that the
procedures in Rev. Proc. 2000-1, Rev. Proc. 2000-2, Rev.
Proc. 2000-3, and Rev. Proc. 2000-7 for issuing letter
rulings, determination letters, and information letters, and
for furnishing technical advice, continue to apply to issues
under the jurisdiction of the Office of Chief Counsel even
though the offices and titles in these revenue procedures
may have changed as a result of the reorganization of the
Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS. Taxpayers should
continue to send requests for letter rulings or pre-
submission conferences on issues under the jurisdiction of
the Office of Chief Counsel to the appropriate address
stated in section 8.03(1) of Rev. Proc. 2000-1. Taxpayers
may continue to address these requests to the associate
chief counsel offices listed in section 8.03(1) even though
some of these offices have changed names or some of the
duties of the offices have been reassigned. The IRS will
forward the requests to the appropriate office. Taxpayers
who are requesting a pre-submission conference by
telephone should continue to call the telephone numbers
listed in section 11.07(1) of Rev. Proc. 2000-1. If the
jurisdiction of the issue has been assigned to another office,
The IRS will forward the call to the appropriate office.
Also, district or appeals offices will continue to send
requests for technical advice on issues under the
jurisdiction of the Office of Chief Counsel to the
appropriate address listed in section 9.03 of Rev. Proc.
2000-2. Notice 2000-35, I.R.B. 2000-__.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayers had owned
a commercial property which was purchased by a city under
threat of condemnation. The taxpayers purchased another
commercial property as replacement property. The court
found that the taxpayers had formed a partnership which
purchased the replacement property with the proceeds of
the sale of the first property. The court held that the
transaction was not eligible for like-kind exchange
treatment because the replacement property was purchased
by the partnership. Sandoval v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-189.
MARKET SEGMENT TRAINING GUIDE . The IRS
has announced the publication of a revised Livestock
Industry Market Segment Specialization Program Audit
Technique Guide. IRPO ¶ 208,501.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
DEFINITION. The taxpayer was a partner with another
individual in a partnership which was formed to purchase
and hold real estate, primarily a mobile home park. The
other individual told the taxpayer that the partnership was
dissolved, however, the other individual used the
partnership name for the individual’s engineering services
business. The engineering income was treated by the
individual as partnership income and the individual used
partnership funds to purchase other real estate. The
taxpayer continued to receive Form K-1 for the partnership
in later years but the forms did not disclose the engineering
income or other partnership activity carried on by the
individual. The court held that the taxpayer remained a
partner in the partnership but that the engineering income
and other activity of the individual was not partnership
income because the activity was beyond the scope of the
partnership and was personal to the other partner. Lang v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-188.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. Lawyers Weekly
USA has reported on a Maryland Court of Appeals case in
which a husband and wife transferred real property to a
wholly-owned LLC. The couple acquired title insurance on
the property when they originally purchased the property
but did not acquire title insurance by the LLC after the
transfer. The court held that, because the LLC is a separate
entity under state law, the LLC was not an insured under
the original title insurance policy, relieving the insurance
company from liability for a defect in title discovered after
the transfer to the LLC. Gebhardt Family Investment,
LLC v. Nations Title Insurance, New York, Inc., No.
1510 (Md. Ct. App. June 6, 2000).
The taxpayers were partners in a general partnership
which was converted to an LLC with no change in the
partners’ interests in the partnership profits, losses, assets or
liabilities. The IRS ruled that the conversion (1) did not
cause the partners to recognize gain or loss; (2) the
conversion was not a sale or exchange; (3) the conversion
did not terminate the partnership; (4) the LLC did not need
to obtain a new taxpayer identification number; (5) the
partners’ holding periods for their respective interests in the
LLC included the holding periods of their respective
interests in the general partnership; (6) the partners’ capital
account balances in the LLC continued to be their capital
account balances from the general partnership; and (6) the
LLC’s initial basis in the assets it received from the general
partnership was the same as the general partnership’s basis
in such assets immediately prior to the conversion. Ltr.
Rul. 200022016, Feb. 29, 2000.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 2000,
the weighted average is 6.01 percent with the permissible
range of 5.41 to 6.31 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.41 to 6.61 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-
31, I.R.B. 2000-__.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES .
The taxpayer was a member of partnerships formed for the
purpose of investing in possible jojoba growing businesses.
The partnerships were on the accrual method of accounting.
Near the end of a tax year, the partnerships entered into a
contract with a corporation for the investigation of whether
it would be feasible to grow jojoba plants in a certain area
in Arizona. The corporation was controlled by members of
the partnership who did not have experience in agricultural
research. The farms attempted to grow jojoba in the area
but conducted no scientific tests or evaluation of the
growing attempts. In Utah Jojoba 1 Research v. Comm’r,
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T.C. Memo. 1997-504, the court found that the corporation
was formed in order to characterize investments in the
partnership as research expenses which were actually
contributions used to develop the farm land. In the instant
case, the taxpayer was assessed additions to tax for
negligence and for substantial understatement of tax. The
taxpayer argued that the negligence penalty was not
warranted because the taxpayer relied on the statements of
the promoters and the taxpayer’s own farming experience
and research into jojoba growing. The court held that the
taxpayer should have known that the research and
experimentation was nothing more than regular farming of
the jojoba and that the taxpayer did not investigate the
legitimacy of the tax benefits gained from the claimed
expenses. The court upheld the addition to tax for
negligence. Fawson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-195.
RETURNS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, filed a
joint return and listed their minor children as dependants.
The taxpayers, however, did not include any social security
numbers (SSN) for the children because the taxpayers
objected, on religious grounds, to the use of universal
identifiers. The IRS agreed that the religious objection was
sincere and that the minor children were eligible
dependants, but denied the personal exemption for the
children, based on the failure to provide the social security
numbers. The taxpayers argued that they should be allowed
to use taxpayer identification numbers (TIN) for the
children. The court held that the SSN requirement fulfilled
a compelling governmental interest because the use of TINs
for persons not exempt from social security taxes could
increase the chances of fraudulent returns by persons who
also acquire SSNs. Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 32
(2000).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 2000
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.60 6.49 6.44 6.40
110 percent AFR 7.27 7.14 7.08 7.04
120 percent AFR 7.94 7.79 7.72 7.67
Mid-term
AFR 6.62 6.51 6.46 6.42
110 percent AFR 7.29 7.16 7.10 7.06
120 percent AFR 7.96 7.81 7.74 7.69
Long-term
AFR 6.40 6.30 6.25 6.22
110 percent AFR 7.05 6.93 6.87 6.83
120 percent AFR 7.70 7.56 7.49 7.44
Rev. Rul. 2000-32, I.R.B. 2000-27.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a
95 percent shareholder in an S corporation. The corporation
had discharge of indebtedness income in one tax year which
was not recognized because the corporation was insolvent.
In addition, the corporation did not have any tax attributes
to be reduced by the discharge of indebtedness income. The
taxpayer increased the basis of the stock by the taxpayer’s
share of the discharge of indebtedness income and offset
the basis by the amount of losses recognized on the value of
the taxpayer’s stock. The Tax Court held that the
determination of discharge of indebtedness income was
made at the corporation level and that the discharge of
indebtedness income did not pass to the taxpayer. The
discharge of indebtedness income was not recognized at the
corporation level because of the insolvency exception. The
appell te court reversed, holding that the S corporation’s
discharge of indebtedness income  not used to reduce the S
corporation’s tax attributes flowed through to the
sh reh lder and increased the basis of the taxpayer’s stock.
The court rejected the holding of Nels n v. Comm’r, 110
T.C. 114 (1998), that discharge of indebtedness of a
corporation does not pass to the shareholders. However, the
court noted that the character of the discharge of
indebtedness income is first determined at the corporation
level, with any reduction of tax attributes taken at the S
corporation level, before passing any remaining discharge
of indebtedness income to the shareholders.  Pugh v.
Comm’r, ¶ 50,514 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’g, T.C. Memo.
1999-38.
WITHHOLDING TAXES. As the result of an
employment tax audit, the taxpayer was assessed FICA
taxes, income tax withholding, and backup withholding on
meal allowances it had paid to its employees in prior tax
years. The audit determined that such meal allowances had
constituted additional compensation and were taxable as
such w n paid to the employees. The taxpayer paid the
payroll taxes assessment in full in a later tax year. The
taxpayer did not seek any recompense from its employees
f r t  amounts representing the employees’ share of the
total. In a subsequent tax year, the taxpayer filed an income
tax refund claim for the year the assessed amounts were
paid, based upon a deduction for the additional amounts
assessed and paid. The IRS ruled that the payment of the
employees’ share of the employment and income taxes was
not an ordinary and necessary business expense and was not
eligible for a deduction. Ltr. Rul. 200025002, March 21,
2000.
ZONING
WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY. The applicant
owned land in an exclusive farm use zone area. The
plaintiff applied for approval to operate a livestock waste
treatment facility on the land. The processed waste was to
be transferred by existing pipes to neighboring land to be
spread on that land as fertilizer. The applicant and neighbor
had obtained permits from the state department of
environmental quality for the waste treatment and disposal.
The plaintiffs were neighbors who challenged the approval
of the conditional use of the land, arguing that the hearing
officer should have included the application of the waste on
the neighboring land because it was an integral part of the
w ste treatment operation. The court held that the permits
obtained by the applicant and neighbor were separate
pe mits for separate operations, allowing the local zoning
b ard to consider each operation separately. The court held
hat, because the applicant had obtained the necessary
permit for its portion of the operation, the board had the
authority to grant the conditional use for the applicant’s
l nd s parate from any approval of the neighbor’s use of the
neighbor’s land. Wilbur Residents v. Douglas County,
998 P.2d 794 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
IN NEW MEXICO
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this
wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by this splendid
resort. The resort is very busy at this time of year, so make your reservations early.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods
resort in the south central mountains of New Mexico. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate
pricing for each combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl
will cover farm and ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday,
Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes
comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break
refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation
date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental
law.
Special room discounts are available at the resort. The resort features a variety of splendid guest accommodations and
activities, including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Pleas  Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 30 days prior to the seminar. A registration form is available online at
www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
